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Study Guide Bava Metzia 34 TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY RENA AND MARK GOLDSTEIN IN LOVING MEMORY OF RENA’S FATHER, MOE SEPTEE, MOSHE BEN HARAV ELAZAR SHMUEL ON HIS 27TH YAHRZEIT. A shomer who can be exempt from payment and decides voluntarily to pay, acquires rights to the double payment (or the 4 or 5 payment for an animal that the robber slaughtered and sold) if the robber is later caught and returns the item. How does this mechanism work if the owner gives rights to the double from the beginning to the shomer in the event that it is stolen, and that the shomer pays, the thief is found - isn't that considered something that is not yet in existence, which cannot be acquired? Rava answers the question but there are two different version of the answer. Is it enough if the shomer just says he/she will pay or does the shomer actually need to pay to acquire the double payment? If the shomer changes his/her claim from "I will not pay" to "I will pay" or the reverse, do we assume that we rule by the second statement or perhaps the second statement in the latter case was just meant to push off paying temporarily? If some of the case details were different, such as, the shomer died and the heirs say, "We will pay," do we assume that the owner only gave rights to the shomer, but not to the heirs? Various similar scenarios are brought to question whether or not the owner would give rights to the double payment to the shomer in those cases. All the questions raised are left unanswered. A halacha is brought that in that case discussed above, the shomer must swear that the item is not in their possession to ensure that they haven't taken a liking to the object and decided to pay for it in order to keep it.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY RABBI ART GOULD IN LOVING MEMORY OF HIS BELOVED BRIDE AND BEST FRIEND OF 50 YEARS, CAROL JOY ROBINSON, KARINA GOLA BAT HUDDAH V’YEHUDA TZVI, ON THE OCCASION OF HER FIRST YAHRZEIT. "YOU WILL BE IN MY HEART FOREVER." There are two more attempts to prove that is a rabbinic law, but they are rejected. Within what distance from the animal is one obligated to help load/unload? What is the order of precedence in dealing with people's lost items between oneself, one's father, and one's rabbi? What is the definition of 'one's rabbi'? Is it better to learn Torah, Mishna, or Gemara? What are the dangers of learning Mishna without learning Gemara? What are the dangers of learning Gemara without learning Mishna? If one is watching another's item (an animal or vessels) and is not getting paid (), and the item is stolen, the s can take an oath and is exempt. If they find the thief and retrieve the item, the thief pays the double payment to the original owner. But if the decides to pay for the stolen item, the thief will pay the double payment to the . Why was it necessary to mention both an animal and vessels?
If one who finds a lost item does not want to lose out on getting compensated for their full wages while attending to the lost item, one can stipulate this in front of a court (three men) and then the one who lost the item will need to compensate the finder the full amount. Raba bar Rav Huna wanted to apply this law to a case where Rav Safra took his half of a shared business deal in front of witnesses, but not three men. Rav Safra rejected this proof, but Abaye brought proof from a different source that indeed Rav Safra was required to divide the money in front of three men. If one finds an animal in a cowshed, it is not considered a lost item but in a public thoroughfare, it is. Is this within the borders of the city or outside the borders? If one's parent tells one to do something against what the Torah commands, one cannot listen to the parent. For example, if a parent tells their child not to return a lost item, the child must disobey the parent. This is derived from Vayikra 19:3 where the commandment to fear one's parent is followed by a commandment to keep Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis have a debate regarding the laws of helping another to load a burden - can one demand compensation for lost wages or not? What is the basis of the debate? Both would agree however, that theoretically one could have derived laws of unloading from laws of loading from a argument. Rava tries to derive from this that the mitzva of the commandment to prevent suffering to animals is a Torah law, as the argument would be that if one is obligated to help load, when there is no suffering to the animal, they are obligated to unload, where the animal is suffering. This is rejected as the argument could be based on the fact that loading does not involve a financial loss and unloading does. But then the Gemara rejects that, as in loading, there is also a financial loss. Various sources are brought to determine if Rava is correct in assuming that is a Torah law.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY MALKA ABRAHAM IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER MOTHER, YEHUDIT BAT MSHALEM ZIZA V'CHANAH. "MY MOM ALWAYS ENCOURAGED WOMEN TO BE LIFELONG LEARNERS AND A LOVE OF YIDDISHKEIT." If one finds an animal wandering, how does one determine if it is lost or if the owner knows its whereabouts? Rava explains that helping to protect another’s field from being destroyed is also included under the commandment to return lost items. Can this be proven from a braita? The Mishna which differentiated between cases of an animal grazing on a path and an animal running in a vineyard leads to inferences that contradict each other regarding grazing in a field and running on a path. Rava and Abaye each resolve the contradiction differently. One needs to return an item multiple times if need be. From where is this derived? Various are brought regarding places in the Torah where a double language is used, such as lost items, sending away the mother bird, rebuking, charity, and others. What is derived from the double language in each verse? How do we assess the compensation one receives for stopping one’s work to attend to a lost item?
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY BAT-SHEVA MASLOW IN HONOR OF HER DAUGHTER YAKIRA BECOMING A BAT MITZVAH AND MAKING HER FIRST SIYUM. "I'M SO PROUD OF YOUR DEDICATION TO LEARNING AND THE AMAZING YOU ARE GROWING INTO." TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY LISA KOLODNY IN HONOR OF NANCY KOLODNY'S MILESTONE BIRTHDAY TOMORROW. "MAY YOU KEEP STRIVING FOR PERSONAL AND SPIRITUAL GROWTH, REACHING NEW HEIGHTS, AND ENRICHING THE LIVES OF ALL OF US AROUND YOU!" According to the Mishna one can stretch out a cloth for its own sake (if it needs airing out) but not for the finder's use. What if the finder does it for both at the same time? The Gemara brings three sources to answer this question but each is rejected. What type of care is needed for the finder of various utensils? What type of use is not permitted with each type of utensil? There are certain cases where one is exempt from returning a lost item. A braita lists three exceptions - a kohen is exempt if the lost item is in a cemetery, an elderly person as it is not within his dignity, and a person whose value of his/her labor is greater than the value of the lost item. A case is brought in which a rabbi acted beyond the letter of the law. The concept of going beyond the letter of the law is derived from a verse (Shmot 18: 20) and Rabbi Yochanan explains the importance of this concept. When we see an object, how do we determine if it is lost or the owner knows about it?
What is a person's level of responsibility toward the lost item once one picks it up and begins searching for its owner? If it is an animal, the finder needs to feed the animal. But if the animal is not producing enough to cover its cost, the owner can sell the animal and will return the money when they find the owner. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva debate whether this money can be used or needs to be set aside - this then affects their level of responsibility for the money in the event of loss/theft. The Gemara assumes that they both agree the responsibility is dependent upon whether or not they can use the object, meaning in a case where they cannot use the object (like a regular case of a lost item), both agree that the finder is not liable for loss/theft. However, this raises a difficulty with Rav Yosef who ruled that one watching a lost item (the finder, who is not permitted to use the object) is considered like a , who is liable for loss/theft. To resolve this difficulty, one can answer that their debate is regarding , unexpected damages, and not loss/theft, and regarding loss/theft all would agree that the finder is responsible. A difficulty is raised against this explanation from the language of the Mishna, but is resolved. There was a case where Rav Yosef tried to rule like Rabbi Tarfon and allow one who was watching money of orphans to use the money, but Abaye challenged his ruling by differentiating between a case of a regular and our case where the finder took care of the animal and then sold it. Details regarding taking care of lost items are discussed - how should the finder take care of the object? What kind of use is permitted, if any? Shmuel rules that one who finds tefillin there is a unique ruling that one is allowed to sell the tefillin and use them - why? A braita compares laws of one who borrows a Torah to one who finds a Torah. The Gemara goes through the different parts of the braita and raises questions and answers them. The Mishna rules that two people cannot read together from a book that was found, but a braita rules that two can, but three cannot. How do they resolve this contradiction? The Mishna rules that if one finds clothing, one must shake it out once every thirty days. However, a statement from Rabbi Yochanan implies that shaking out clothing can ruin it. Several resolutions are suggested.
As another difficulty is raised against Rava's explanation for being a rabbinic law, Rava concludes that one can retrieve a lost item by bringing by Torah law. What if two people bring or one person brings and the other witnesses or the other one witness? Rava explains cases where two people bring different identifying details and explains which is the stronger one. For how long does the finder need to announce the lost object? Rabbi Meir holds until the neighbors know. The Gemara explains that "the neighbors" refers to the neighbors in the neighborhood where the lost item was found. Rabbi Yehuda says one must announce it on the three r, holidays, and for seven days after the last one to allow people to go home, see that they lost the item, and come back to claim it. This amount of time mentioned contradicts a Mishna in Taanit 10a regarding when we start to pray for rain as there it states that it takes fifteen days for the people who live farthest to get home. How is this contradiction resolved? Once the Temple was destroyed, the finder would announce in the shuls and the batei midrash. But at a certain point in history, the lost items were given to the authorities so people would spread the word more quietly among their neighbors. In the Temple, the finders would announce lost items in a place called the and the ones who had lost items would go there to retrieve their lost items. Even when one brought , they would question them even further to ensure they weren't lying. Rav Yehuda and Rav Nachman disagree about whether one would announce "I found a lost item" or "I found a cloak (for example)." Can we find support for one of the opinions from the Mishna? Originally, they were not concerned that people would lie about lost items and take items of others, but as time went on, people took advantage. As a result, the Sages instituted that to retrieve an item with , one would have to bring witnesses attesting to the person's honesty. If the lost item is an animal that can work and generate revenue, the finder should keep the animal if the revenue exceeds the upkeep costs. If not, the finder can sell the animal and return the money to the owner. Can the finder use the money? If yes, the finder is responsible for replacing it, if the money gets lost. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree about this issue. Even an animal that generates more revenue than cost, after twelve months pass, the finder can sell it. Two braitot list different amounts of time necessary to wait before selling calves and foals, and geese and roosters, as they do not generate enough income. How are the contradictory braitot reconciled?
The Mishna rules that if one finds money among fruits that one has purchased, one can keep the money. Rabbi Yannai limits this to what circumstances? A braita is brought which also corresponds to Rabbi Yannai's limitation. The verses in the Torah relating to lost items list several items that are lost that should be returned. What is derived from each of these terms? Rabbi Yehuda and Tana Kamma disagree about whether to derive the halakha that one does not need to return an item that is less than the value of a pruta from the words "that get lost" or from the word "and it was found." Is there a practical ramification between the two opinions or is it just a matter of which words to derive it from? What does each derive from the other word? Is the ability to retrieve a lost item by providing a Torah law or rabbinic? The ramifications for this question: would a lost be able to be returned to the woman if she brought ? Four sources are brought in an attempt to prove that lost items can be retrieved by by Torah law or rabbinic law, but all are rejected. Is this issue a tannaitic debate, as can be found in a debate regarding the identification of a dead man based on a mole, to permit his wife to remarry? However, the Gemara suggests three other possibilities for the reasoning for the debate that are not based on whether or not are a Torah law. Rava explains that if are not a Torah law, on what basis can the rabbis institute that items can be returned by if perhaps it may allow for the "wrong person" to collect a lost item if he/she happens to be able to provide ? After Rav Safra raises a difficulty with Rava's reasoning, Rava offers an alternative explanation. The Gemara raises a difficulty with that as well but then resolves the difficulty.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED IN MEMORY OF HARAV SHMARYAHU YOSEF CHAIM BEN YAAKOV YISRAEL, RAV CHAIM KANIEVSKY ZT"L. When one finds an object in a wall, what clues are there in the placement of the object that can attest to whether it belonged to the owner or to someone from the street who left it there? If the object was placed in a part close to the house, but the house was rented to others, there is no obligation to return the object. How does this halacha fit with the Mishna in Shekalim 19 where we assume that money found on the streets of Jerusalem during the holiday season was second tithe money and not from money that may have been left there from the week before? Reish Lakish quotes Bar Kapara and explains that it refers to a room rented to three Jews. How can one explain that in light of the issue in Bava Metzia 24 where they grappled with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s opinion and were unable to decide whether or not there is despair when there is a majority of Jews. There are two resolutions to this question. Rav Menashia bar Yaakov explains that there were three gentiles, not Jews. But Rav Nachman differentiates between the case that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar was relating to and this case. Rav Nachman’s explanation of this case is consistent with another teaching of his. Raba limits the case of the teaching of Rav Nachman. Raba describes three cases where there is a combination of theft and restitution of lost property and explains what offenses the one who found lost property committed. The Mishna rules in cases where money is found in a store or in a money changer’s store. What are the guidelines for keeping the lost item? Rabbi Elazar rules about a case that was not mentioned in the Mishna. Is it possible to raise a difficulty on his ruling from the wording of the Mishna? What in the Mishna motivated him to understand the halakha in this way?
TODAY’S DAF IS DEDICATED IN MEMORY OF ILAI DAVID GARFINKEL OF THE DUVDEVAN COMMANDO UNIT WHO WAS KILLED ON FRIDAY. The Mishna lists various items that if found, one should announce in order to return to its owner. The Gemara explains in more detail some of the cases and how the item needs to be found, i.e. fruits in a basket but not next to the basket, money in a particular formation. Contradictory sources are brought and resolved. The next Mishna describes various items that if found in a particular location, the item would not be considered lost, but perhaps placed there by the owner. Therefore, one is not allowed to take the item, even to try to return it. These are items without identifiable signs that are left in a semi-protected area. Since the items have no identifiable signs, the owner will have no way to retrieve his/her item. One of the semi-protected areas is a garbage dump. After bringing a contradictory braita, Rav Zevid and Rav Papa offer different resolutions - either to distinguish between items that were likely placed there or likely fell there by accident, or between garbage dumps that are cleared/not cleared. If an item is found inside a wall, what guidelines are given to know whether or not it belongs to the owner or is ownerless, as they were left by some previous owner or by someone on the street who forgot about it?
Shmuel listed three areas in which we can assume Torah scholars may be dishonest. Why? Can we assume they are honest in all other areas? Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that if something is lost in a public place, we can assume the owner despaired (has given up hope of ever getting the item back) and the finder can take the item. The Gemara questions whether he meant this only in a place where the majority of the people are Gentiles or even in a place where the majority are Jews. If he included also a place where the majority are Jews, do the rabbis agree, or do they disagree with him about both, or only in a case where the majority are Jews? Do we hold like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and if so, in both cases or only in the case where the majority are Gentiles? The Gemara tries to answer these questions by bringing various tannaitic sources and cases from the amoraim but most attempts to answer the questions are inconclusive.
Study Guide Bava Metzia 23 TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED IN MEMORY OF RAV MOSHE BEN DAVID, RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN ZT"L. * * TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY TERRI KRIVOSHA FOR A REFUA SHLEIMA FOR HER HUSBAND HAYIM HERRING, HARAV HAYIM YEHUDA BEN TZIPPORA. Raba and Rava disagree about - can the location be a , and is something a if it can be stepped on and ruined? How do they each explain the braita in which the law distinguishes between lost bundles and sheaves? Is the disagreement between them regarding that can be ruined by stepping on them also the same disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna in the case of a shard found in a fig cake or a coin in a loaf of bread? At first they suggest that it is, then they reject that explanation and explain the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir in a different way - according to Rava and Raba. There is another version of the discussion in which it is not suggested at first that the dispute between them is related to the debate between Rava and Raba, but that it depends on whether or not we assume that people will step on food. That is rejected as well. The Gemara goes over other cases listed in the Mishna and explains why there is no need to return strings of fish and pieces of meat. There is a contradiction between a braita and a Mishna regarding barrels of wine and oil - should they be returned or not? How is the contradiction resolved? What is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's opinion at the end of the Mishna that vessels do not need to be returned? What is ?
STUDY GUIDE BAVA METZIA 22 TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY NANCY KOLODNY IN HONOR OF THE BIRTHDAY OF HER DAUGHTER-IN-LAW LISA KOLODNY. "WIFE, MOTHER, DAUGHTER, LEARNER, TEACHER, ATHLETE, FRIEND EXTRAORDINAIRE." TODAY'S DAF IS BEING SPONSORED BY BETSY MEHLMAN IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER FATHER, HAROLD MONDSHEIN, ZVI MENAHEM MENDEL BEN SHLOMO, ON HIS 40TH YAHRZEIT. "HE WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD TO SEE HOW HIS GRANDCHILDREN AND ISRAELI GREAT-GRANDCHILDREN ARE THRIVING IN ISRAEL." There are five more attempts to support either Rava or Abaye's position in their debate regarding , when one picks up a lost item without any identifiable features, if the owner has not yet despaired of the item (because the owner doesn't even know yet that it was lost), can we assume that since the owner will despair when he/she realizes it is lost, the finder can acquire the item now. After rejecting all of the attempted proofs, only the last one is brought as clear support for Abaye's position. This is one of six cases where the ruling is like Abaye over Rava. An abbreviation for the six cases is Ya'AL Ka'GaM. Raba and Rava disagree about whether a siman that can get trampled is a siman and whether location can be considered a siman. Then our Mishna and a braita are brought and the Gemara explains how the source can be understood according to Raba and Rava's opinions.
The Gemara raises two more difficulties against Rav's ruling that a receipt of payment is not returned to the borrower if found among documents of the creditor, and resolves them. The second chapter begins with a list of items that if one finds them on the street in a particular manner, they can assume the owner lost them and is not expected to retrieve them and can therefore keep them. One of the items listed is scattered fruits - how were they left? How many and in what size space is this referring to? Rabbi Yirmia asks questions on the answer to these questions to understand whether it is because the amount of these fruits is not significant or because it is too much trouble to collect. Abaye and Rava disagree on the subject of 'despair that is not known' - if it is not known that the owner has despaired on finding their lost item, when they later despair, can we view it as if they despaired from the beginning and the finder can keep the object? Rava rules that the finder can keep the object, and Abaye rules that the finder cannot. The Gemara explains that in certain cases both will agree that there is certainly immediate despair or no despair at all. Then they bring a series of questions against Abaye from tannaitic sources, most of them from our Mishna. Abaye explains all the difficulties against him as cases where we can be certain the owner knows immediately that it is lost and is sure to have given up. One difficulty from a braita is raised on Rava and is resolved.
A braita states that if a receipt is found saying that the husband (or his heirs) paid his ex-wife the money from her , , if the woman agrees, we return it to the husband as proof he paid. Why are we not concerned that perhaps the the money was not repaid on the date written on the receipt, but was paid later, and the couple is conspiring to retrieve her that she sold after the date written on the receipt, but before the actual payment? Rava and Abaye each suggest answers. The Mishna lists types of documents that if found on the street can be returned as there is no concern that one could collect money not due to them. The list includes , documents assessing land of a debtor to be seized by a creditor, the commitment of a husband to pay for food of his wife's daughter, documents attesting that a or was performed, and others. If documents were bundled up together or found in a way that one could claim it by offering identifiable markings (), they can be retrieved as well. If a receipt of payments is found, even by the creditor, it is given to the debtor as proof of payment. Rav Huna did not permit a found in the street to be used as he was concerned that perhaps it belonged to people with the same names who lived in a city with the same name as written in the . Raba disagreed with Rav Huna based on our Mishna which permits returning documents ratified by the court and is not concerned that the documents belonged to other people. This led to an argument between Raba and Amram who responded disrespectfully to the other, which then caused a pillar to break in Rav's beit midrash. The Gemara defines a number of the objects mentioned in the Mishna - , , and documents that are and . One who finds a bunch of documents bundled together announces that he/she found documents and the one who lost them can retrieve them by identifying how many and how they are bound. Rav ruled that if a receipt attesting to payment of a loan is found with the creditor's documents, we cannot assume it was paid as the creditor may have written it so that when the borrower is ready to pay, the receipt will be ready. However, this contradicts a ruling in our Mishna that a (receipt of payment) found in the creditor's papers is returned to the debtor. To resolve this, they bring a differentiation Rav Safra made regarding a different source that it depends on if it was found with ripped papers of the creditor or with the creditor's regular papers. Two other Mishnayot are brought to raise the same type of difficulty against this statement of Rav and are all resolved in the same manner.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY ALLIE ALPEROVICH IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER GRANDMOTHER, FRIMA IOSILEVICH WHO PASSED AWAY THIS WEEK A MONTH SHY OF HER 98TH BIRTHDAY. Rav Ashi was uncertain whether the law that a person can retrieve lost items by giving an identifying mark (siman) is a Torah law or not. As a result, when he reconciled the contradiction between the Tosefta that permitted one to return a lost to the wife when the husband agreed and Mishna that did not, he explained that it could be returned if the husband gave a , a very clear one, and not more generic . Raba bar bar Hanna lost a that he was supposed to deliver. It was found and he retrieved it by giving a (a basic one) and also by , visual recognition, which is specifically permitted to Torah scholars, but he was unsure if the rabbis permitted it to be returned to him on account of the or the visual recognition. The Tosefta Bava Metzia 1:5, quoted previously, ruled that a for divorce or emancipation document for a slave can be returned to the wife/slave if the husband/owner agrees. Both documents have financial ramifications, as the produce of the woman's property becomes her own in the event of divorce, and items the slave purchases belong to his owner while he is a slave but are his own if he is a free man. If so, why are we not concerned that perhaps they were not divorced/freed, and by returning the document to the woman or slave, we may be allowing them to collect property that is not rightfully theirs? If one gives a gift using the language "now and after death," the body of the item is given as a gift, but the produce is still owned by the original owner until his/her death. There is another contradiction between our Mishna and a braita as our Mishna states that wills can be returned if the owner admits he/she gave it and we are not concerned that the owner wrote it and then changed his/her mind and never gave it to the recipient, and a braita states that even if both agree that it was given, we do not return the document to either one. Rabbi Abba bar Mamal resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases - the Mishna refers to a promise of one on one's deathbed (which one can rescind) and the braita refers to a gift of a healthy person (which can't be rescinded). The Gemara explains in detail the relevance of that distinction. Rav Zevid resolves the contradiction differently. He says that both the Mishna and braita refer to a gift on one's deathbed but the Mishna is in a case where the one who wants to return the deed is the person who wrote it and the braita is when it is his son (after the original owner's death).
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED IN HONOR OF AUDREY MONDROW FROM HER CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN. "YOU ARE AN EXAMPLE OF A LIFETIME LEARNER." TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY GABRIELLE AND DANIEL ALTMAN IN HONOR OF THE MARRIAGE OF THEIR DAUGHTER, SOPHIA ALTMAN TODAY, AND ALSO THE RECENT MARRIAGE OF THEIR SON, ISAAC ALTMAN, AND THE YAHRTZEIT OF MOSHE RABBEINU. "SENDING BRACHOT THAT THE ULTIMATE FIND MATCHES FOR ALL OF THOSE WHO ARE LOOKING." TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY SYLVIA (SARA DEVORA) SIMMONS IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER FATHER, AVRAHAM NACHUM BEN YISROEL SIMELIS Z"L ON HIS YAHRZEIT TODAY. "SURVIVOR OF THE KOVNO GHETTO, "A BRAND PLUCKED FROM BURNING FIRE" HE PLANTED THE SEEDS OF TORAH LEARNING WITH HIS ENDURING FAITH STILL INSPIRING TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE." There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the money, even if she did not have a written . Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write and women used their documents to collect their money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her money even without producing the document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY KAREN CARTER IN HONOR OF JULIE HILTON DANAN'S BIRTHDAY! "HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO MY FIRST CHEVRUTA!" In what cases is one no longer trusted to take an in court that he/she paid back the loan? Rav Nachman was quoted as differentiating between a case where the court had ruled "Give the money back" and "You are obligated to pay." However, there were two different versions of the situation in which Rav Nachman distinguished between the cases. Two statements of Rabbi Yochanan are brought where based on a false claim one makes regarding a case, they are no longer believed to be able to take an oath relating to that case. Rabbi Asi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if a promissory note stamped by the court is found with today's date, we can assume it was not yet paid back as people do not generally return loans on the same day. However, this contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yochanan that is premised on the fact that people could pay loans back on the same day. This is resolved in two possible ways. Rabbi Yochanan makes another statement that if something is deemed obligatory by the court, such as a , then one is not trusted to say "I already paid it back" (if they can't bring witnesses to prove it) even if the other side does not have a document in hand. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba questions Rabbi Yochanan by asking isn't that an explicit Mishna? Rabbi Yochanan responds by saying that without his statement, it would not have been clear from the Mishna. Abaye suggests that what Rabbi Yochanan said cannot be derived from the Mishna but then changes his mind and explains that it can be, using as proof a case of a widow from betrothal who receives money. Rav Keshisha tries to find a source for Abaye's halakha about a betrothed woman from a Mishna but rejects his own suggestion. own suggestion.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY MIRIAM ADLER IN HONOR OF HER CHILDREN’S RETURN TO KIBBUTZ SAAD. "MAY THEY HAVE MANY HEALTHY AND SAFE YEARS WHILE BUILDING AND PLANTING IN ארצנו הקדושה." Rav holds that if the seller of stolen land subsequently purchased the land from the original owner, the assumption is that the seller originally sold the land and any rights to the land that the seller may have in the future. Therefore, the land is fully owned by the buyer. The logic behind Rav's ruling is a source of debate between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi. Is it because the seller doesn't want the buyer to call him/her a thief or because the seller wants to be known as reliable? What is the practical difference between the two? Three answers are brought - the first two are rejected. The Gemara mentions variations on this case where Rav would theoretically rule that the seller did not intend to pass over rights to the buyer. At what stage in the judgment process is this ruling of Rav no longer relevant? Two questions are raised against Rav, but they are resolved. Another ruling of Rav on a related issue: If a seller says to a buyer, "This field will be yours from now, when I purchase it," the sale is effective. Rav holds by Rabbi Meir that one can acquire an item that is "not yet in the world." Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a document in the street that was either ratified by the court or was a (in which the land is automatically liened from the date of the document regardless of whether the loan happened or not), gets returned to the credit. Can we assume that it was not yet paid, since if it was, the borrower would have ripped it up, or do we assume that it was paid back, since if it wasn't, the lender never would have lost it?
STUDY GUIDE BAVA METZIA 15 TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY BARBARA GOLDSCHLAG IN HONOR OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF ALIZA GOLDSCHLAG AND SAM CLARKE. If one sold a field that he/she stole, when the owner takes back the land and the buyer returns to the seller to retrieve the money from the sale, Shmuel holds that the seller does not need to reimburse the buyer for improvements to the field. The second difficulty raised against Shmuel is resolved in three possible ways. A third difficulty is raised as Shmuel himself said that the buyer receives a guarantee of the enhancements. To resolve this, Rav Yosef suggests a possible way that the buyer of stolen property can demand the value of the enhancements from the seller after the property is taken away. There are two different versions of Rav Yosef's answer. In the context of this discussion, they mentioned a different opinion of Shmuel that a creditor who seizes liened property for a loan can take the enhancements as well. Rava proves this from the language of a sale document which includes a guarantee for the enhancements. Why would there be a guarantee for enhancements for a sale and not for a gift? If one buys property knowing it is stolen and the owner takes back the land, Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not the buyer can get his/her money back from the seller. The basis of their argument is discussed and compared to another case where they also debate the same issue. Why is there a need to show they disagreed in both cases?
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY AMY GOLDSTEIN IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER FATHER, MELVYN SYDNEY GOLDSTEIN, ON HIS 4TH YAHRZEIT. "HE WAS GONE TOO SOON, AND HIS PRESENCE AND GOOD COUNSEL ARE MISSED BY MANY OF HIS FRIENDS AND FAMILY." How does the braita previously quoted raise a difficulty with Shmuel on two counts? Another statement of Shmuel is brought explaining the rabbi's position - that even if a document doesn't say that the property is liened to the loan, the property is still liened to the loan, as we assume the scribe forgot to add it. Rava bar Itai raises a contradiction between that statement of Shmuel's and another statement of Shmuel's in a different context. The Gemara then distinguishes between the cases - one was a loan and the other was a sale. A story is brought to support this distinction. Abaye mentions a few laws about liened property. If a creditor collects from liened property, the debtor can get involved to bring a claim against the creditor even though the creditor seized it from the one who purchased it from the debtor, as the debtor is still considered an involved party. Can one back out of a deal if rumors are circulating that the land doesn't belong to the "owner"? At what stage, and does it depend if the land was sold with a guarantee? If one sold a field that he/she stole, when the owner takes back the land and the buyer returns to the seller to retrieve the money from the sale, Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not the seller needs to reimburse the buyer for improvements to the field. Shmuel does not allow the buyer to collect the money for improvements as it looks like an interest payment. Rava raises a difficulty with Shmuel but it is resolved. A further difficulty is raised against Shmuel but it is resolved as well.
Study Guide Bava Metzia 13 If someone finds a promissory note in the street and it is unclear if it was paid back or not, can it be returned to the creditor? According to Rabbi Meir, it depends on whether or not the document specified that there was property lein on the loan - if there was, the document is not returned, if there was not, it is. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that in both cases, the document is not returned. There are two suggestions to explain the case of the Mishna - is it a case where the debtor agrees that the loan was not yet repaid or does the debtor claim it was repaid? First, the Gemara suggests the former and explains the position of Rabbi Meir that there may be a problem with the date of the loan written in the contract. Therefore there is a concern that land will be collected improperly from a date that may have preceded the loan. However, a contradiction is brought from a Mishna in Bava Batra where no such concern exists. Rav Asi and Abaye resolve the contradiction in different ways. Difficulties against each position are raised and resolved. In the resolution of Abaye's opinion, they assume that Abaye holds that Rabbi Meir is concerned that if there is a property lien, the creditor and debtor may conspire together to lie in order to repossess and share land that the debtor sold. As Shmuel is not concerned about a conspiracy, he must either hold like Rav Asi or perhaps he understands the case in the Mishna differently - that the debtor claims the loan was repaid. If so, the basis for Rabbi Meir's distinction is that he holds if a document does not include a property lien, it cannot be collected at all. Therefore, if there is no property lien, it can be returned to the creditor without concern of it being collected. Still, it is returned so the creditor can use the paper for other uses, i.e. to cover a jug. If it has a property lien, we trust the debtor that the loan was already paid back and it is not returned to the creditor. There is a debate among Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar about whether Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree in a case where the debtor admits there is still a loan or one where the debtor denies it. They each explain according to their position the basis of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis. The Gemara introduces a braita and explains that it supports Rabbi Yochanan's position and raises one difficulty with Rabbi Eleazar's position and two with Shmuel. However, a difficulty is raised as the braita disagrees on two issues with Rabbi Elazar!
THIS MONTH'S LEARNING IS SPONSORED IN LOVING MEMORY OF SHAY URIEL BEN CARMIT & HARAV SHIMON PIZAM AND AYAL MEVORACH BEN SHIRI CHAYA & MORDECHAI MOTI TWITO. THIS WEEK'S LEARNING IS SPONSORED BY NIRA FELDMAN IN LOVING MEMORY OF FAYE DARACK Z"L, FINKEL BAT BARUCH V'DINA IN COMMEMORATION OF HER FIRST YAHRZEIT. Rav Ashi explains why if a husband puts a bill of divorce in his wife's courtyard, it is only effective if she is standing nearby, whereas, for a gift, there is no need to be standing near the courtyard. This is based on the principle that one can do something that is in a person's best interest (gift) not in their presence but one cannot do something bad for another (divorce) not in their presence. Rava asks about a case where someone throws a wallet and it goes through the airspace of another's property - is it acquired by the owner of the property as in the case of the Mishna? How is the case different from the case brought in the Mishna? The next Mishna teaches: If the following people find a lost item, the item goes to the father/husband/owner: a young child, a wife, and a Caananite slave. If the following people find a lost item, they can keep it for themselves: an older child, a Jewish slave, and a divorced woman even if she did not receive her . Shmuel explains that a child who finds a lost item goes to his/her father as it is common for children to give items they find to their parents. This implies that Shmuel holds that a child does not acquire items by Torah law. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel from a braita regarding a worker who leaves sheaves that fall in the field () and his child can collect them. The sages suggest three possible resolutions. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Shmuel as he understands the word "minor" in the Mishna not to be referring to a minor as one underage but one who is supported by his father, in which case the Mishna teaches nothing regarding the ability of a minor to acquire items. A braita states that a day worker who is hired to do everything for the owner and finds a lost item on the job, the item goes to the one who hired him. This contradicts the Mishna which states that a Jewish slave who finds lost items can keep them. The sages suggest three solutions. What is the case of a Jewish slave woman in the Mishna who gets to keep lost items - shouldn't they go to her father, and if he died, didn't Reish Lakish teach that she go free? To resolve this, they explain that the Mishna means the item goes to her father, not her master. Why does the Mishna need to teach that a divorced woman can keep items she finds? Isn't this obvious?! The case must be one where there is a doubt about whether or not she is divorced. If one finds promissory notes, are they returned to the creditor? On what does it depend? Why?
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY EMMA AND RICHARD RINBERG IN HONOR OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THEIR SON JOSEPH TO SHACHAR, DAUGHTER OF AYELET AND AMIR YEFET OF SHOHAM. After concluding that everyone agrees that if a husband puts a get in his wife's courtyard, she is divorced because her courtyard is considered an extension of her hand, the Gemara brings three explanations as to what Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about regarding the acquiring of an item through the courtyard of a minor. If people are running after an animal with a broken leg who has entered into someone's field, the owner of the field can acquire it by saying "My field acquired it" since the animal is incapable of running away. But if the animal could run fast and escape, then that statement would be ineffective. Shmuel qualifies the Mishna that the field is unprotected and the owner is standing nearby. The Gemara brings proof from a braita that in an unprotected field, the owner must be nearby in order to acquire an ownerless item in the field. The braita contradicts itself and therefore an alternative reading is suggested which is used to prove Shmuel. However, the Gemara suggests an alternative reading of the braita to reject the proof, but that reading is not accepted. Ulla and Rabba bar bar Hana also qualified the Mishna in the same way as Shmuel. Rabbi Abba raises a difficulty against Ulla from a Mishna in Maaser Sheni 5:9 about Rabban Gamliel giving rights to to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva while they were on a boat by giving them rights to a piece of land on his property. Since they were not standing near the property, one can prove that they acquired it without being next to the property. One possible response to the difficulty is to explain that the act of acquiring was a whereby one who acquires land and moveable items, acquires the land (through money) and the moveable items automatically become theirs. Rabbi Abba didn't accept this response and Rava explains why. Rava suggests that since there was an easier way to do it - by a , and they did not use that method of acquiring, it must be because giving rights to is not valued as money, since the belongs to all the Levites/poor people and choosing which one is just considered a benefit. However, the Gemara rejects Rava's suggestion and explains that gifts of the tithes are considered money and explains why a symbolic act of acquisition would not have been effective, but is. Rav Papa offers a different answer to Rabbi Abba's difficulty by distinguishing between an ownerless item and one that is passed on by someone else. Is this an accurate distinction, as Ulla rules that when a husband passes a get to a wife's courtyard, it will only be effective if she is standing nearby?
The Gemara quotes a Mishna in Peah 4:9 that describes someone who takes part in the corner of another's field on behalf of a poor person. Ulla and Rav Nachman disagree about whether the debate Mishna in Peah is only when a wealthy person takes the item for the poor person or even a poor person for a poor person. Rav Nachman raises a difficulty with Ulla’s ruling from our Mishna. How do Ulla and Rav Nachman understand the case in the Mishna differently to correspond to their understanding of the Mishna in Peah? A creditor cannot ask someone else to collect a debt when the debtor also owes others and may not have enough funds for all the creditors as they are causing a loss to others. Only the creditor him/herself can collect the loan. Does that concept apply to a lost item since potentially it is causing everyone else not to acquire it or since there is no potential financial loss for anyone as the lost item wasn't something they are owed, one can acquire it for a friend? Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda disagree with Rabbi Yochanan on this issue. The Mishna rules that one who jumps on an item does not acquire it. Reish Lakish brings a halakha in the name of Rabbi Abba Bardala Cohen that one acquires everything within the four cubits surrounding a person. A difficulty is raised against this statement from both a Mishna in Peah and our Mishna and three answers are brought for each source to explain why it does not contradict, the first is rejected and the last two are accepted. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a minor girl's divorce document can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard or in the four cubits surrounding her. The first suggestion is that the argument is based on whether a courtyard functions as an extension of one's hand or as a messenger. However, this is rejected.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY RIKKI AND ALAN ZIBITT IN LOVING MEMORY OF HELEN ZIBITT ON HER 24TH YAHRZEIT. "MOM WAS A DEVOTED AND LOVING MOTHER, GRANDMOTHER AND GREAT-GRANDMOTHER, WHO LIVED A LIFE FILLED WITH , , LEARNING AND . MAY HER MEMORY BE A BLESSING." TODAY’S DAF IS DEDICATED BY THE HADRAN WOMEN OF LONG ISLAND IN HONOR OF THE BIRTH OF A GRANDSON TO CHERYL SAVITSKY. "A CELEBRATION OF THE INAUGURATION OF OUR FRIEND AND CO-LEARNER, CHERYL, INTO THE GRANDPARENTS’ CLUB. NO MATTER WHAT THE NEW PRINCE (BORN TO ELIANA AND SHIMMY) WILL CALL YOU AND AVI, WE ARE CERTAIN OF TWO THINGS: THAT HE HAS WONDERFUL ROLE MODELS OF TORAH, A AND , AND THAT YOU WILL HAVE ENORMOUS FROM HIM AND THE ENTIRE FAMILY! תזכו לגדלו לתורה ולחופה ולמעשים טובים!" Rav Yehuda holds that riding on an animal does not mean that one has acquired the animal. A braita is brought to support his opinion – first by an inference and then by a particular use of wording in the braita. But both attempts are rejected. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty against Rav Yehuda, but they are resolved. The first braita itself seems to be difficult and to resolve it, they change the wording of the braita. Rabbi Avahu explains the difficulty without changing the wording, but the Gemara rejects his explanation. The second braita explains that actions can create an acquisition of an animal when the action taken is a typical one such as riding an animal in a field or leading an animal in the city. Rabbi Elazar asks if one can acquire objects that are on an animal by pulling the animal if one does not intend to acquire the animal. His question presumes that if one acquires the animal, then one acquires the objects that are on the animal. Rava questions this presumption as the animal is like a “walking courtyard” that cannot acquire items in it. To resolve this, they assume that Rabbi Elazar’s question was only relevant in a case where the animal was tied up. Two difficulties are raised against Rava’s ruling that a “walking courtyard” does not acquire items, but are resolved. The Mishna says that if one sees a lost item and asks someone to pick it up for him/her, as long as the one who picks it up has not yet handed the lost item to the person who asked for it, the person can claim it as their own. The Gemara quotes a Mishna in Peah 4:9 that describes someone who collects part of the corner of another's field on behalf of a poor person. Ulla and Rav Nachman disagree about whether the debate in the Mishna in Peah is only when a wealthy person takes the item for a poor person or even a poor person for a poor person. Rav Nachman raises a difficulty with Ulla’s ruling from our Mishna.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY ROCHEL CHEIFETZ IN LOVING MEMORY OF HER AUNT, ROSE RUBELOW, RACHEL BAT HARAV MOSHE V'TZIPORA MASHBAUM WHOSE YARTZEIT WAS 26 ADAR. When the law is to split an item, the meaning is to split the market value. There are three attempts to prove this from our Mishna or tannatic sources. The first two are rejected but the last is accepted. Rami bar Hama teaches that one can derive from our Mishna that one who finds an item on the street and picks it up on behalf of another, is effective. Rava disagrees and only permits it in a case where the one who lifted it acquired part of it for him/herself and therefore can acquire the rest for someone else. But if one acquired it exclusively for someone else, it would not be effective. Rava proves this by comparing a case of one who stole on behalf of another and one who stole on behalf of oneself and another (partners). Rava teaches a halakha based on this principle but the Gemara modifies it as it is incomprehensible as transmitted. From which line in the Mishna did Rami bar Hama derive his opinion? The Gemara suggests five possibilities - all are rejected except the last one. Shmuel is quoted as having said about riding on an animal and leading it - one is an act of acquiring and the other is not. Which one is it? Rav Yehuda infers from a Mishna that riding is not an act of acquiring as holding the reigns will only work in a sale where one is passing to the other, but holding the reigns on an ownerless animal is not a valid act of acquiring. How does this all fit with our Mishna where it is clear that riding on the animal enables one to acquire a lost animal? To answer this, they explain the Mishna in a case where the one riding was also leading the animal with his/her feet. If so, why does the Mishna mention leading in two different ways?
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY EITAN AND PNINA LIPSKER "IN HONOR OF ALL THE WOMEN DAF YOMI LEARNERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO MAKE AN EXTRA-HUMAN EFFORT TO JOIN THE HEBREW ZOOM AT 6:20 EVERY MORNING. THEY ADD AND TORAH TO AM YISRAEL. MAY WE BE BLESSED TO CONTINUE TO LEARN TORAH DAILY AND ." After deliberations on Bava Metzia 6 regarding a contested item that was sanctified by one of the parties, the Gemara brings a ruling that the sanctification is not effective unless the one who sanctified had proof of ownership that would hold up in court. However, this is limited to land, as the sanctification of moveable items is ineffective unless the item is physically in the domain of the one sanctifying it. Rav Tachlifa brings a braita that states if two people are holding on to part of the tallit, each one gets to keep the part they are holding on to and the remainder is divided evenly. Rabbi Avahu added that this is only if they take an oath. In light of this braita, Rav Papa explains that our Mishna must refer to a case where each was holding onto the edge of the garment. Comparisons are made to other cases like a or a , divorce document, where two people are holding onto the object. Are these cases similar or different to our case and why? How is the garment divided if there is gold running through it? A braita discusses the case of two people holding a document - the creditor claiming ownership, such that the debtor still owes the money, and the debtor claiming ownership as the loan was already paid back. Rebbi says the document is validated if the witnesses' signatures can be confirmed. They explain this to mean that if it is validated, the document is split, but if not, since the debtor admits there was a loan, but claims it was paid, the debtor is believed as "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted." Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says they split it in either case. The principle of "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted" is not relevant here as there is a document as well. If the document is found near the judge (meaning, the judge validated it), the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi disagree - is it never able to be collected or does it remain valid for collecting? Rabbi Yosi holds it can be collected as we are not concerned that the debtor already paid back the loan. However, this is difficult in light of a different braita relating to a that is found and contested by the husband and wife, Rabbi Yosi rules (against the rabbis) that if the woman is divorced or widowed, we assume it was paid. The rabbis suggest three possible ways to resolve the contradiction. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan differentiate between a typical case where two people are holding a document and a case in which one is holding the main part () and one is holding the (the summary at the end which does not include the date. What exactly is this case and how would it be divided? How do we assess the difference between the value of the and the ?
Since Rabbi Yochanan explained the reason for the oaths in the Mishna is to prevent one from grabbing the tallit from the other, the Gemara continues to prove that if one can be believed to take an oath even if we are concerned they have stolen. The third attempt to prove this is from a statement of Rav Huna regarding a who claims something happened to the item which would exempt the , but he/she chooses to pay for the item. They take an oath, even though there is a concern that perhaps they want to keep the item for themselves. Again, this proof is rejected as the pays money for the item and can therefore justify keeping the item. Three other oaths - , a case with a shopkeeper and workers, and the oath taken by a who claims the item was last or stolen can all prove that even one who perhaps is lying is trusted to take an oath. Abaye brings an alternative explanation for the oaths in the Mishna as he does not hold that we can trust one who perhaps is stealing to take an oath. According to Abaye, the concern is that there is a doubt about whether one owes money to the other and therefore the creditor grabs the tallit as payment for the loan in question. Why is Abaye not concerned in that case as well for a false oath? Rabbi Zeira asks: if the two people were holding the tallit in the court and one grabbed it from the other, does the one now holding the entire tallit have full rights to it? In what exact case was this question asked? What are the arguments for and against? Assuming the one holding it gets to keep it, would the same hold true if one consecrated the whole tallit without having grabbed it since regarding consecration, speech is considered the same as pulling an object. To answer this question, the Gemara brings a story about a bathhouse that two people claimed rights to, and then one of them consecrated the bathhouse. Rav Hamnuna ruled that the consecration worked and learned it from a Mishna about a but Raba rejected his proof. Rav Chanania brings proof from a braita for Raba's explanation and Abaye first rejects the proof but then reinstates it.
TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY ABBY FLAMHOLZ IN HONOR OF HER DAUGHTER IN LAW, SIGAL. "SHE IS A SUPERWOMAN AND INSPIRATIONAL WIFE, MOTHER AND TORAH JEW!" TODAY'S DAF IS SPONSORED BY ROMI AND JOSH SUSSMAN IN HONOR OF THEIR OLDEST SON FINISHING 3 YEARS AND 8 MONTHS OF SERVICE IN THE IDF THIS WEEK. "WE HAVE BEEN IN AWE OF HOW YOU CARRIED YOURSELF WITH GRACE, CONFIDENCE, DETERMINATION AND LEADERSHIP SINCE THE DAY YOUR SERVICE STARTED. THROUGH COUNTLESS NIGHTS IN THE SHETACH AND MONTHS IN GAZA, YOU HAVE STAYED TRUE TO YOURSELF. WE LOVE YOU AND COULDN'T POSSIBLY BE MORE PROUD OF YOUR SERVICE!" One more question is raised against Rav Sheshet who holds that one who partially admits a claim but says '' is exempt from taking an oath and one attempt is brought to prove Rabbi Chiya who held that an oath is required, but the question is answered and the proof rejected. The sugya goes back to the original statement of Rabbi Chiya that if there are witnesses to part of the claim, the claimant must take an oath on the second part. A contradiction is raised from a drasha on a verse in the Torah, but an alternative explanation is offered. There was a case with a shepherd who denied a claim and there were witnesses for part of the claim. Rabbi Zeira asked why did they not require the shepherd to take an oath according to Rabbi Chiya? Abaye questioned Rabbi Zeira as the shepherd should not be allowed to take an oath since two witnesses testified against the shepherd that he took items that were not his own, making him a thief who is not trusted to take an oath in court. Why did Abaye need to call the shepherd a thief, any shepherd is not believed in court as shepherds generally bring their animals to graze in other people's fields? Both Abaye's question and the Gemara's question on Abaye are resolved. An issue is raised with the language of the oath in the Mishna regarding the case of two people holding onto a tallit, "I do not have ownership of less than half" as the language is ambiguous and could lead to one taking the oath even though one does not have any rights at all to the tallit. Rav Huna therefore changes the language of the oath required to prevent abuse of the system. The Gemara suggests some other suggestions for the wording of the oath and explains why the Mishna did not choose them. Rabbi Yochanan explains the purpose of the oath is to prevent one of the people holding the tallit from grabbing a tallit that someone else found and claiming it as their own. If so, the purpose of the oath is to clarify that one of the parties is not lying. If we suspect the person may be lying, how can we trust them to take an oath? The answer is that people who are suspected of taking other people's items are not presumed to lie under oath as the latter is taken more seriously. The Gemara attempts to prove this assumption, first from one who admits to part of a claim (), then from Rami bar Hama's position about the oath of the , but both are rejected as the concern in both those cases is not that the claimant is truly lying, but just trying to push off the creditor temporarily. They further try to prove this assumption from a statement of Rav Huna about a shomer who claims something happened to the item which would exempt the shomer, but he/she is choosing to pay for the item. They take an oath, even though there is a concern that perhaps they want to keep the item for themselves. Again, this is rejected.
